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LAW IN THE MAKING: A UNIVERSAL REGIME
FOR DEEP SEABED MINING?
Elliot L Richardson *
On March 2, 1981, as diplomatic delegations were beginning to as-
semble in New York, the Reagan Administration provoked consterna-
tion in the corridors of the United Nations with a startling policy
announcement. The United States, it was revealed, would not be pre-
pared to agree to the conclusion of a Convention on the Law of the Sea
at what many had hoped would be the tenth and final session of a Con-
ference that has been going on for the last seven years.
The announcement was based on a preliminary United States re-
consideration of the text, which had led to the conclusion that there
were enough serious grounds for concern to warrant a more extensive
review over a period of months, once the new subcabinet officials di-
rectly involved had been in office long enough to get their teeth into the
issues. The principal area of concern was proposed arrangements for a
new international authority to govern deep seabed mining. The an-
nouncement itself was drafted hastily by an interagency group in the
office of newly confirmed Deputy Secretary of State William P. Clark.
Only five days later, on March 7, the Administration abruptly dis-
missed Ambassador George H. Aldrich as Acting Special Representa-
tive of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference. Aldrich, who
served superbly as my deputy for three years, had succeeded me as
"Acting" United States Representative and had expected to be asked to
stay on for the Tenth Session. With Aldrich went two other senior ca-
reer officers who had been with me throughout my tenure as chief ne-
gotiator.
When United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim convened
the first plenary meeting of the Tenth Session on March 9, I was not
particularly surprised to hear reports of general dismay and uncertainty
among the delegates of other participating countries. Did the an-
nouncements mean that the new administration had already virtually
decided that the "package deal" that it inherited was not satisfactory?
Or was the review to be genuinely objective, with neither adverse nor
favorable prejudgments on the product of negotiations to date? The
Senior resident partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, Washington, D.C. Ambassa-
dor Richardson headed the United States delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference from
February 1977 to October 1980. He now serves as Chairman of the Public Advisory Com-
mittee to the delegation. A.B., Harvard University, 1941; J.D., Harvard University, 1947.
Although Ambassador Richardson is greatly indebted to Theodore S. Wilkinson and
Lawrence M. Enomoto of the United States Department of State for valuable assistance in
the preparation of this article, the views it expresses are his own.
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answers were not immediately apparent to those assembled at Turtle
Bay, nor are they clear now; no doubt they will be debated for some
time to come.
Whatever the reasons for the volcanic events of early March, it may
be instructive to review the background and the evolution of the issue
of greatest controversy-the charter for an international regime to gov-
ern the exploitation of the deep seabed. An understanding of this com-
plex but central issue is critical for those who need to know how we
arrived at the present stage of negotiations and for satisfactory results
from any further negotiations.
In many respects the Conference on the Law of the Sea has been a
cumulative process of harmonization and codification of existing law,
either customary or conventional (as embodied in the four 1958 Con-
ventions'), but without regard to the provisions for the deep seabed. In
defining the concept of the seabed as "the common heritage of man-
kind," the Conference was embarked on pure lawmaking on a clean
slate-the creation of totally new rules of organization and conduct by
some 160 nations, the most nearly universal assembly of representatives
of the world's governments that has ever been convened. The last in-
ternational legislative effort of equal or greater scope, the drafting of
the United Nations Charter, was accomplished by the representatives
of only fifty-one countries. Two-thirds of today's international com-
munity of nations, with all their heterogeneity, were at that time still
under colonial administration.
Because of sheer numbers and diversity of participants, among
other factors, the process of lawmaking involved in building consensus
on the seabeds text has been slow and tortuous. Finding formulas to
bridge gaps among the differing interests of all participants in the ex-
ploitation of the deep seabed has been the most challenging task before
the negotiators. But the good will, industry, and ingenuity of a truly
remarkable assembly of delegates have prevailed, and the results are
gratifying, even though some adjustments may yet need to be made.
Moreover, the process sets valuable precedents for future negotiations
of similar scope.
This article first outlines the genesis of the "common heritage" con-
cept; the framework for the negotiations of the 1970's undertaken to
implement the concept; objectives of the seabed mining industry; and
the difficulties of achieving miners' objectives within the negotiating
framework. The article then describes the steps taken to overcome
these difficulties in the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, and
the parallel action that some governments are taking to harmonize na-
1. Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S.
No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on Fishing and Conservation
of Living Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559
U.N.T.S. 285.
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tional seabed mining plans through legislation. Finally, it suggests
some prospects for improving the Convention and potential supple-
mentary actions that can be taken unilaterally by the United States or
by others.
THE COMMON HERITAGE CONCEPT
Since Hugo Grotius predicated the freedom of the seas more than
300 years ago on two principles of Roman law--res nullius and res com-
munis omnium 2-- these principles have been interpreted controversially
both to defend and to deny the lawfulness of certain ocean activities by
sovereign nations. The emergence of new technology has given rise to
acute controversy over possible exploitation of the ocean floor. Poten-
tial seabed mining nations have used the res nullius principle to argue
that manganese nodules, like fish, may be appropriated by any state or
private enterprise. Conversely, developing countries have used the res
communis principle to argue that manganese nodules may not be ap-
propriated by anyone without agreed rules to ensure that exploitation
of the seabed would be in the common interest.
By the mid-1960's, it began to seem that there would soon be little
left on the ocean floor to argue about. The jurisdictional claims of
coastal nations were no longer "creeping" seaward. They were on the
march.
As one of the world's largest coastal nations, the United States
stood to gain from an extension of its control over the resources of the
shelf and the ocean floor. But our country stood to lose access to areas
claimed by others. Moreover, the prospect of anarchic scrambling for
national advantage posed real threats to the peace. Having weighed
the various interests involved, President Johnson declared in 1966, "We
must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms are, and remain,
the legacy of all human beings."3
2. Res nullius is defined as "the property of nobody." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (5th ed.
1968). Res communis omnium is defined as "the common possession of everyone." Id at
1173.
3. Remarks of President Lyndon B. Johnson at the commissioning of the research ship, Ocea-
nographer, 2 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 930 (July 13, 1966). For more complete con-
text, President Johnson remarked that
[tiruly great accomplishments in oceanography will require the cooperation of all the
maritime nations of the world. And so today I send our voice out from this platform
calling for such cooperation, requesting it, and urging it.
To the Soviet Union-a major maritime power-I today extend our earnest wish that
you may join with us in this great endeavor.
In accordance with these desires I am happy to announce that one of the first long
voyages of Oceanographer will be a 6-month global expedition in which the scientists
from a number of our great nations will participate. It is our intention to invite Great
Britain, West Germany, France, the U.S.S.R., India, Malaysia, Australia, New Zea-
land, Chile, and Peru to participate in the first round-the-world voyage of Ocea-
nographer.
We greatly welcome this type of international participation. Because under no cir-
cumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the prospects of rich harvest and mineral
wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among the maritime nations. We
must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands under the high seas. We
1981]
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In 1967, Arvid Pardo, Malta's Ambassador to the United Nations,
made his now-historic statement calling for comprehensive United Na-
tions action to reserve the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction as "the common heritage of mankind."4 To seek
ways to realize Pardo's goal, the General Assembly in 1967 established
the Ad Hoc Seabed Committee,5 and in 1969, the majority of the Gen-
eral Assembly overrode the opposition of res nullius states, including
the United States, in calling for a "moratorium" on all exploitation of
the deep seabed pending the establishment of an international regime.6
In 1970, a "Declaration of Principles," adopted by consensus of the
General Assembly, 7 was somewhat more ambiguous on the legality of
interim preparations for exploitation.
Whatever the nuances of national attitudes toward the "common
heritage" principle, there was no question but that translating it into a
workable regime would be the primary focus when actual negotiations
began. Preliminary work had already been entrusted to a subcommit-
tee of the United Nations Seabed Committee, and this became the
charge of the First Committee of the Conference after its formal begin-
ning in 1973. The remaining issues-navigation, continental shelf and
coastal-zone delimitation, pollution, and marine science-were to be
handled by the other main committees of the Conference.8 Despite this
must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of
all human beings ....
Id
4. See Note Verbale dated 17 August 1967 from the Permanent Mission of Malta to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. Do. A/6695 (1967).
5. The Ad Hoc Sea-Bed Committee, composed of 35 States, was established by G.A. Res. 2340
(XXII), Examination of the Question of the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of
the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil thereof, Underlying the High Seas Beyond
the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction and the Use of their Resources in the Interests of
Mankind, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 14, U.N. Doe. A/6716 (1968). A permanent
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction, composed of 42 states, was established by G.A. Res. 2467A (XXIII),
Examination of the Question of the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Underlying the High Seas Beyond
the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction and the Use of Their Resources in the Interests of
Mankind, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 15, U.N. Doe. A/7218 (1969).
6. G.A. Res. 2574D (XXIV), Question of the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Underlying the High Seas Be-
yond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction, and the Use of Their Resources in the
terests of Mankind, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 11, U.N. Do. A/7630 (1970). The
resolution was adopted by a vote of 62 to 28, with 28 abstentions.
7. G.A. Res. 2479 (XXV), Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 25 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 28) 24-25, U.N. Doe. A/8028 (1971).
8. The General Assembly, ...
(2) Decides to convene in 1973. . .a conference on the law of the sea which would
deal with the establishment of an equitable international regime--including an inter-
national machinery-for the area and the resources of the sea-bed and the ocean floor,
and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, a precise definition
of the area, and a broad range of related issues including those concerning the regimes
of the high seas, the continental shelf, the territorial sea (including the question of its
breadth and the question of international straits) and contiguous zone, fishing and con-
servation of the living resources of the high seas (including the question of the prefer-
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compartmentalization, no complete separation of the issues of the vari-
ous committees would be possible, particularly in periodic plenary
meetings. This, of course, was an additional complicating factor in de-
signing the seabed regime.
THE FRAMEWORK FOR COMMITTEE I NEGOTIATIONS
Beyond the agreed organizational precepts, delegates who assem-
bled for the first formal session of the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in July 1974 in Caracas
were bound only by national instructions as to what the regime should
look like. On the other hand, it was clear that the vast majority of
participants were working on the basis of certain apriori principles and
objectives derived implicitly from the debate and resolutions of the
United Nations General Assembly over the preceding decade. To be
broadly acceptable, the architecture of the regime would have to be
consistent with these principles.
As a cardinal principle, it was universally understood that no claims
of sovereignty would be recognized over portions of the ocean floor
beyond the national jurisdiction of coastal states (that is, beyond the
outer limit of the continental shelf, which was itself to be defined by
Committee II).9 The international commons of the ocean floor thus
created came to be known simply as "the Area."
It followed that some form of international control would be
needed to regulate any exploitative activities that might be contem-
plated, in particular the mining of manganese nodules. To exercise this
control, there would have to be some form of collective governing
body, eventually designated "The Authority," whose composition,
functions, powers, and decisionmaking processes would need defini-
tion.
The views of delegations differed sharply, however, as to the extent
of international control over seabed mining activities to be derived
ential rights of coastal States), the preservation of the marine environment (including
inter alia, the prevention of pollution) and scientific research ....
G.A. Res. 2750C (XXV), Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the Sea-Bed and
the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Underlying the High Seas Beyond the Limits of
Present National Jurisdiction and Use of Their Resources in the Interests of Mankind, and
Convening of a Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 26-27, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1971).
9. The view that seabed claims have no basis in law was directly challenged by an assertion of
exclusive rights to 60,000 square kilometers of the ocean floor by Deepsea Ventures, Inc., in a
letter to Secretary of State Kissinger on November 14, 1974. Copies of the letter were sent to
several other governments. In an unusually prompt reply for legal opinions (November 18),
the Department of State made clear that it did not "grant or recognize mining rights to the
mineral resources of an area of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." This
exchange is described and analyzed fully in Burton, Freedom of the Seas. Jurirdictional Law
Applicable to Deep Seabed Mining Claims, 29 STAN. L.R. 1135 (1977). The author concludes
that the concepts of res mllius and res communis are of limited applicability for uninhabit-
able areas, but that based on other legal and practical considerations, "mining of the deep
seabed with reasonable regard for others is lawful, but exclusive mining claims, like the
Deepsea Ventures claim, are not." Id at 1180.
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from the "common heritage" principle. Moreover, there appeared to
be little interest in striking compromise on this issue. Obviously, it
would not be easy to provide for a free market system with first-come,
first-served competition under a superstructure negotiated by govern-
ments with widely differing economic philosophies.
To the developing countries, the "common heritage" concept of-
fered an opportunity to advance the New International Economic Or-
der-to put into practice an economic concept which heretofore had
only been preached. Starting from the notion that the development
patterns of the past were inseparable from an "imperialist," "colonial-
ist," international hierarchy, the ideologues of the Group of 7710 pro-
jected a "brave new world" for the exploitation of the seabed, under
which all states would share in governance on an equal basis. Agile
and loose-footed multinational corporations, no matter how adept at
maneuvering among their bases of operations, would be given no toe-
hold to operate independently. The international authority would be
designed not only to regulate and supervise seabed mining but also to
monopolize its operation. The only role for individual national indus-
tries, private or public, would be to provide facilitative services on a
contractual basis. A potential seabed miner in its own good time, the
USSR interpreted the "common heritage" as one shared by sovereign
states; while seeking assured access to seabed mining for state-spon-
sored entities, the USSR also took advantage of openings for fulsome
plenary statements expressing solidarity with Third World aspirations.
In contrast, the industrialized delegations of the West based their
approach to the design of the "regime" on more pragmatic considera-
tions. If mankind as a whole was to benefit from the riches of the sea-
bed, a means to exploit these riches would first have to be developed.
Vast preliminary expenses would be required, and the risks were high.
The concept promoted by the Group of 77 seemed oblivious to the
need to encourage such ventures.
PERSPECTIVE OF SEABED MINING INDUSTRY
Governed by economic imperatives rather than ideological abstrac-
tions, the world's potential seabed miners were involved in two particu-
lar activities of note in the mid-1970's: (1) continuing exploration of
the ocean floor in search of the richest areas for potential extraction;
and (2) competitive research and development toward the most effec-
tive means for eventual commercial mining. To sustain its investments
10. The "Group of 77" is an unofficial bloc of developing countries which emerged in response
to various economic and political factors in 1964 at the first session of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development. These nations "often act in the United Nations in a
co-ordinated fashion." The Group of 77 has retained its name despite the fact that member
nations now number 117. See P. HAJNAL, GUIDE TO UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION,
DOCUMENTATION & PUBLISHING 116-17 (1978).
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in these activities, the industry needed reassurance with respect to two
paramount concerns:
First, individual mining enterprises would need guaranteed and ex-
clusive access to specified areas of the ocean floor. Without such ac-
cess, neither governing boards nor bankers would be inclined to take
multi-million dollar risks involved in moving from research into a de-
velopment phase of deep seabed mining.
Second, the prospects for a reasonable rate of return on investment
would have to be auspicious. Necessary factors in assessing likely re-
turns would include at least the cost of recovery, transport, and process-
ing equipment for the minerals of the ocean floor; prevailing and
projected metals prices; and any necessary payments to an interna-
tional manager.
No major investor questioned the need for some form of agreed
international Authority. Indeed, in the absence of such an Authority,
would it make sense to proceed? What governments could reasonably
be expected to support their constituent industries' claims and to guar-
antee security of tenure without the concurrence of key maritime states
and hopefully also the vast majority of participants in UNCLOS III?
Any government contemplating such unilateral action in the midst of
negotiations would have invited a range of reprisals-legal, political,
and, conceivably, even military. The United States did not, nor did
others.
On the other hand, the Group of 77's insistence on creating a mono-
lithic entity for seabed exploitation along the lines of a nationalized
industry in a socialist country threatened to delay seabed-mining devel-
opment indefinitely. Such an entity would have no prospect of access
to developed countries' capital, and there was no realistic possibility
that the developing countries would direct their own resources into
deep seabed mining. Even if the necessary billions could be found, this
would not in itself have assured that the necessary technology could be
acquired.
The Western position at the outset was based upon diametrically
opposed assumptions. The "common heritage" implied some form of
international control over seabed mining but not the actual conduct of
seabed mining operations by an international entity. It would have
been sufficient to give the Authority the functions of a registration bu-
reau. The Authority would be charged with licensing potential miners
who could demonstrate compliance with clear technical criteria; col-
lecting appropriate fees for licenses and, perhaps, a share of profits to
be distributed among participants according to agreed formulas; and
ensuring compliance with reasonable environmental regulations.
BRIDGING THE GAP: THE PARALLEL SYSTEM
Against this background of apparently irreconcilable conceptions of
1981]
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the "Authority" emerged, early in the Conference, the idea of a "paral-
lel system," opening up the opportunity for seabed mining both to na-
tionafly sponsored firms and to an international entity. First suggested
by several developing countries, this classic, down-the-middle compro-
mise was proposed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1976. Sim-
ply stated, the "parallel system" would provide for assured access to
seabed mining sites for the industries of the developed countries on a
relatively open, competitive basis; at the same time an equal number of
sites would be reserved for eventual exploitation by an international
"Enterprise" under the direct control of the international Authority.
In addition, Secretary Kissinger agreed that the Enterprise, in order to
be viable, should be provided with the necessary start-up financing and
technology.
Although I concluded soon after becoming head of the United
States Law of the Sea delegation that the parallel system had a better
chance for acceptance than other alternatives such as a unitary system
of joint ventures, it was far from certain early in 1977 that the compro-
mise could gain broad enough support to produce a consensus in its
favor. Neither the Group of 77 nor our own mining industry was con-
vinced that its interests had been adequately accommodated. Further
difficulties arose in the summer negotiating session of 1977, when a rea-
sonably balanced draft negotiating text was radically and unacceptably
altered at the last moment by the Chairman of the First Committee,
without consultations with the United States or any other industrial
country. "
The parallel system had been generally accepted in principle by
early 1978, but controversy over the basic elements of the regime per-
sisted. The question of a resource policy governing seabed exploita-
tion-once considered a distinctly subordinate issue-had now become
acute. Despite the broad interest of net consumers of seabed metals,
who constitute the overwhelming majority of nations, the small group
of land-based producers whose markets would be affected by seabed
mining had formed an effective lobby.
Early in 1978, I identified three major issues that continued to beset
the conference:
(1) The first is the system of exploitation of the seabed. This issue
opposes those whose optimum position calls for unlimited access to
mine sites for qualified companies and State enterprises against those
who would prefer to see all exploitation reserved for the international
equivalent of a government monopoly. The issue posed is essentially
one of economic pluralism versus state centralism projected on a global
scale.
(2) The second is the resource policy which guides and regulates
seabed production. This issue involves many complex international
I1. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.10 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as ICNT].
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economic questions, such as whether all minerals on the seabed are
subject to control by the Authority and whether the Authority's powers
should extend to fixing prices and regulating markets. The question
which perhaps most sharply divides the Conference is the extent to
which the production of seabed minerals should be limited. Here the
interests of consumers of these minerals-mainly nickel and copper-
clash with those of land-based producers of the same minerals. Con-
sumer interests would benefit from a liberal policy of unfettered pro-
duction of seabed minerals; land-based producer interests, conversely,
would benefit from a restrictive policy of limited production.
(3) The third contentious issue is the question of the governance
of the international institutions created to manage seabed mining.
This too is a multifaceted problem. The point of most intense dispute
concerns the degree to which the international Authority should be
controlled on a one-nation one-vote basis versus the degree to which
recognition should be accorded to such major interests as those in pro-
duction, investment, and consumption.'
2
The situation at that point seemed bleak enough that I also felt con-
strained to say:
The United States will do its part to achieve an equitable and dura-
ble outcome. We will go halfway to meet those with whom we differ.
To go beyond that would be not only to sacrifice our own essential
interests but to acquiesce in a global system incompatible with the in-
terest of all countries in encouraging efficiency and innovation. I will
not support, nor would I commend to the President, a treaty which
creates a regime for the seabed that I cannot honestly defend as offer-
ing a reasonable basis for American companies to risk the enormous
investments demanded by deep sea mining.
Rather than accept outcomes which we consider wrong for the
United States and, we believe, would be wrong for the world commu-
nity as well, we would reluctantly choose to forego a treaty. The
United States does not need a comprehensive treaty more than other
nations. Seabed mining can and will go forward with or without such
a treaty. We have the means at our disposal to protect our oceans'
interest if the Conference should fail, and we shall protect those inter-
ests if a comprehensive treaty eludes us. 3
During the same period, it also seemed appropriate to make prepa-
rations for the contingency that there would be no agreed international
regime for the seabed, at least not for some time to come, and work was
intensified on draft United States legislation to cover the interim gap.
The possibility of an alternative "mini-treaty," dealing only with deep
seabed mining and embodying the licensing approach favored by the
major western industrialized countries, but open to all countries, was
floated for the first time, partly as a tactical ploy, partly as a falback to
12. "The Law of the Sea Conference: Is a Comprehensive Treaty Still Possible?," address by
Elliot L. Richardson at The Seapower Symposium of the Cincinnati Council of the Navy




be pursued if the Conference should fail to reach agreement on a com-
prehensive treaty.'
4
The slow but steady progress made in the three years since the
1977-1978 nadir of the negotiations would be the subject of another
detailed article. Suffice it to say that 120 significant changes were
made in the negotiating text to render it more acceptable to the western
industrialized countries, versus fifteen changes that could be considered
adverse from their viewpoint.
The consideration given in the West to interim and alternative solu-
tions, in particular deep seabed mining legislation, seems to have had a
cathartic effect. The legislation enacted by the United States 5 and the
Federal Republic of Germany 6 in 1980, although designed merely to
allow continued orderly development of seabed mining under an in-
terim national regulatory system of licenses and permits pending an
agreed conclusion of UNCLOS III, clearly sounded a warning note.
France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom are in the process of enact-
ing similar legislation. Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands may follow
suit in due course.
The effect of enacted and proposed legislation has been twofold.
On the one hand, outcries of indignation greeted the United States del-
egation on arrival in Geneva last summer for the Resumed Ninth Ses-
sion of the Conference. The Group of 77 made clear, both individually
and collectively, that no alternative to a universal regime, no "mini-
treaty" among western industrialized states and such others as they
could induce to join in it, would be tolerated by the vast majority. On
the other hand, there is no doubt that the prospect of a collaborative
arrangement among the industrialized democracies, to the exclusion of
others, provided new impetus to UNCLOS III. The last, seemingly in-
tractable issue of decisionmaking by the Council of the Authority was
14. See R. DARMAN, THE LAW OF THE SEA: RETHINKING U.S. INTERESTS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
373 (1978). Darman concludes:
In sum, U.S. strategy should be reoriented in three rather different, but nonetheless
mutually consistent, directions: (1) it should exhibit a clear-eyed willingness to accept
Conference failure as a non-disastrous, indeed thoroughly tolerable, outcome. (2) It
should deliberately seek to break down "North-South" polarization-not by conces-
sion, but by greater practical attention to, and argument on behalf of, interests that
cut across North-South lines. (3) As both a hedge against Conference failure and a
prod toward Conference success, it should proceed with the development of a "mini-
treaty," outside the Conference framework. In addition, the United States must, of
course, continue all conventional elements of negotiation in good faith--relying par-
ticularly on vigorous intersessional consultation and pre-Conference informal negoti-
ation-across the full range of disputed issues. Whether this would be enough to
yield a satisfactory comprehensive treaty, however, must remain uncertain.
Id at 394.
15. U.S. Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1473 (West Supp.
1980) (to be codified in 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473). The text of the U.S. Act is reprinted in 19
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1003-20 (1980); for a discussion of the U.S. act, see Note, Interim
Deep Seabed Mining Legislatiox An International Environmental Perspective, 8 J. LEGIS. 73
(1980).
16. Fed. Republic of Ger. Act on Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining, [1980]
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 9080 (W. Ger.). The German statute became effective August
17, 1980.
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resolved, and with this achievement, the major elements of a Draft
Convention that was very close to commanding consensus appeared to
be in place. As noted above, delegates looked forward to concluding
the Conference in 1981.
THE DRAFT CONVENTION
At this juncture, it is necessary to look in somewhat more detail at
the Draft Convention itself and to examine how it would accommodate
the essential objectives of the mining industry.
Assured Access
To be assured of the opportunity for deep seabed mining, a pro-
spective miner who has the necessary capital and expertise must be as-
sured that the International Seabed Authority's contract approval
process is fair, clear, and well-nigh automatic. The criteria spelled out
in Annex III of the Treaty satisfy this requirement.' 7 An applicant has
only to be sponsored by a State Party and to satisfy the specific
financial and technical qualifications that are to be spelled out by a
"Preparatory Commission" subsequent to signature of the Conven-
tion.'8
The applicant's plan of work must fulfill the specifications with re-
spect to such matters as size of area, diligence requirements, and min-
ing standards and practices-including those relevant to the protection
of the marine environment--that will be set forth in the regulations. If
these requirements are met, the plan of work must be approved; there is
no discretionary basis for its rejection.
The determination as to whether the applicant and his plan of work
comply with the applicable criteria is made by a fifteen-member Legal
and Technical Commission subordinate to the Council of the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority. The Commission is obligated to base its rec-
ommendations solely upon the provisions of Annex III and to report
fully to the Council.
Any plan of work which the Commission finds consistent with the
requirements of Annex III will be deemed approved by the Council
17. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.62/WF.10/Rev. 3 at 130-51 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention]. The
principal seabed regime provisions may be found in Part I (id at 1), Part XI (id at 49-80),
and Annex III.
18. The Preparatory Commission will be established by a Conference Resolution. A draft of the
resolution was proposed by the late President of the Conference, Ambassador Hamilton
Shirley Amerasinghe. The Commission would, among other functions, draft the provisional
rules, regulations, and procedures for the future Authority. Under the current text (art. 308,
para. 4), these rules, regulations, and procedures would apply, pending their formal adoption
pursuant to article 162, paragraph 2(n)(ii), and article 160, paragraph 2()(ii). Under article
16, paragraph 7(d), decisions by the Council concerning issues arising under article 162,
paragraph 2(n), must be taken by consensus. Taken together, these provisions ensure that
any rule, regulation, or procedure drafted by the Preparatory Commission would continue in
effect so long as any member of the Council objected to a proposed change.
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within a fixed time unless the Council decides, by consensus, to disap-
prove it. The automaticity of the system could only be frustrated if
three-fourths of the Council made a conscious and determined effort to
elect unsuitable Commission members who would ignore the require-
ments of the Draft Convention.
Return on Investment
Capital outlay, operating costs, and metal prices-not payments for
the right to mine, such as fees, royalties, and profit shares-are the
dominant factors governing the return on any mining investment. The
latter, nevertheless, must not be excessively burdensome. In this re-
spect, the Draft Convention's financial provisions are no worse than
most other tax systems. The front-end load is modest in proportion to
the size of the investment involved. It consists of "ground rent," which
is payable until production begins, and the cost of prospecting the
minesite, which is turned over to the Enterprise under the "banking"
system.'9 The application fee is tied to the actual cost of processing the
application but is limited in any case to $500,000. The "ground rent"
of $1 million per year may be credited against royalties (the "produc-
tion charge") once production begins and is waived if a contractor is
held up by a lack of tonnage under the production ceiling.20 The cost
of prospecting a minesite is estimated at $10 million.2
Once production begins, the production charge and profit-sharing
payments come into play. They take effect in two stages; the first,
before the investment has been recovered, and the second, afterward.
In the first stage, the production charge is 2% of market value of the
processed metals produced by the project. In the second stage, it in-
creases to 4% unless the return on investment in a given year would fal
below 15%, in which case the production charge reverts to 2% for the
year. The profit-sharing payments are based on a graduated, incre-
mental schedule. During the first stage, the rates are 35% for income
providing a return on investment of 10% or less, 42.5% for income pro-
viding a return between 10% and 20%, and 50% for income providing a
return in excess of 20%. In the second stage, the corresponding rates
are 40%, 50%, and 70%. Unlike the production charge which applies, in
effect, to all proceeds, the profit share applies only to the fraction attrib-
19. The "banking" system is based on the concept that an applicant for a seabed mining contract
must indicate the coordinates of an area sufficiently large and of sufficient estimated com-
mercial value to allow two mining operations. Within 45 days the Authority will then desig-
nate which part of that area is to be reserved solely for activities of the Enterprise or for a
joint venture with developing states. This designated area will become a reserved or
"banked" site as soon as the applicant's plan of work is approved and contract with the
Authority is signed. See Draft Convention, supra note 15, Annex III, art. 8, at 137.
20. The production ceiling is the interim system ef limitation (not to exceed 25 years) under
which an applicant's annual nickel production authorization is based on a 15-year trend line
of nickel consumption. See Draft Convention, supra note 18, art. 151, and text accompany-
ing notes 25-26 infra.
21. These are informal estimates provided by industry representatives.
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utable to the mining portion of the project, or to 25% of the proceeds,
whichever is higher.
Under this system, it should be noted, the Authority has no in-
dependent power to adjust or levy "taxes." The payments are fixed,
and the Authority would simply serve as a bus conductor does in col-
lecting payments from entrants.22
Protection Against Abuse
In addition to the assurance of access and the opportunity to earn a
fair return on investment, the third essential requirement of a viable
seabed mining regime is protection against the arbitrary or unpredict-
able exercise of the Authority's regulatory powers.
One measure of protection derives from the fact that a Preparatory
Commission will be charged with drafting the Authority's initial rules
and regulations. My own projection has been that the Commission
would meet essentially full-time for perhaps two years. Experts will
have more influence in such a forum than in the Law of the Sea Con-
ference itself. The United States' Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Re-
sources Act 23 requires similar rules and regulations and the
coordination of these rules and regulations with other such regulations
in interim arrangements with "reciprocating states." Thus, United
States experts in the Commission's deliberations should be well-pre-
pared to present convincing proposals based upon thorough review and
perhaps experience with the early stages of implementation.
A second measure of protection against the abuse of power is the
care with which the powers and functions of the Authority have been
allocated. Although the text still refers to the Assembly as the
"supreme organ" of the Authority, it is no longer possible to read this
phrase in its present context as conferring power to usurp the executive
role of the Council in managing the seabed mining regime.
Third, the Council itself has been prevented from taking majority
action contrary to the vital economic interests of its seabed mining and
consumer members. This was the most important single achievement
of the 1980 Geneva Session. Amendments to the initial rules and regu-
lations adopted by the Preparatory Commission, which will govern
matters critical to the conduct of mining operations, will now require a
22. Although referred to as "taxes," the Authority would not in fact have "taxing" powers. In
my reply, entitled "Factless and Feckless: Safire's Triumph of Yahooism," to a column by
William Safire in the Washington Star of March 19, 1981, I made these points:
Contrary to his claim that the International Seabed Authority would have "its own
taxing powers," the fact is that the types and amounts of payments to be collected by
the Authority are expressly set forth in the treaty. The Authority would no more have
"taxing powers" than the fare collector on a bus. As to the legitimacy of any pay-
ments at all, the answer is that a community of nations should have the same rights
with respect to resources owned in common as a single nation has toward its individu-
ally-owned resources.
The Washington Star, March 25, 1981, at A-17, col. 3.
23. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1473 (West Supp. 1980) (to be codified in 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473).
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consensus of the Council. Consensus will also be needed for the rejec-
tion of a plan of work approved by the Legal and Technical Commis-
sion,24 as well as for amendments to the Convention and measures to
protect land-based producers. Most other issues will be subject to a
three-fourths vote, and the remainder, to a two-thirds vote. Any new
power assigned to the Council will require a consensus, if so provided
m the rules and regulations confirming the power or if no voting rule is
specified; any dispute as to the voting category to which an issue be-
longs will be decided by the higher-or highest-of the majorities in
question. Not least, the United States has now been effectively assured
a seat on the Council by a new provision which gives each interest
group or regional group entitled to representation the right to select its
own representatives.
Fourth, security of contract is explicitly protected, both against ac-
tion of the Authority and against amendment by the eventual Review
Conference scheduled for fifteen years after the commencement of
commercial mining under the Authority. In fact, rules and regulations
issued or revised subsequent to the conclusion of a mining contract
could not be applied retroactively to that contract-a provision which
may warrant some modification in the case of environmental regula-
tions.
As a final measure of protection in the event that none of the fore-
going safeguards prove sufficient, provision has been made for the
binding adjudication of disputes. The dispute settlement procedure
can be summarized as follows:
a. Any contractual dispute between a contracted miner and the
Authority, or a dispute as to whether the terms offered by the contrac-
tor for the sale of his technology to the Enterprise are within the range
of fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, may be taken
to commercial arbitration by either party.
b. An eleven-member Seabeds Dispute Chamber of the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, to be established under Annex
VI of the Convention, is also available to any State Party, to any con-
tracting party, and to any miner who applies for a contract. The
Chamber has the power to correct abuses of discretion or actions taken
in excess of power, including failure to approve a plan of work. The
Chamber can also be called upon by a commercial arbitral tribunal to
interpret the Convention.
c. Disputes between State Parties may, at the option of either
party, be brought before an ad hoc panel of the Seabed Disputes
Chamber.
OTHER SENSITIVE AREAS
Although the hazards of uncertain access to mining sites, excessive
24. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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"bites" on return on investment, and abuse of authority have been
carefully circumscribed in the Convention, there are other sensitive ar-
eas to consider.
The Production Ceiling
At the 1980 Geneva Session, it was agreed that approval of a plan
for work will no longer be tied to the availability of a nickel-production
allotment; however, the timing of access will remain dependent upon
the authorization of production under the ceiling. The very existence
of the ceiling has been troublesome for the United States and other
consumers of seabed metals. They confronted a coalition of land-based
producers and developing countries whose insistence on transitional
protection against the loss of markets demanded some accommodation.
As now formulated, the production ceiling is not likely to bar access to
any qualified miner. The amount of permitted production is substan-
tial, a "floor" has been added, and the constraint on seabed production
is limited in duration.
25
Because the formula in the text is based upon a projection forward
of past trends, it is impossible to predict exactly what level of produc-
tion will be allowed during the fifteen years that the limit will, in effect,
apply. Taking 3.4% as a reasonable and conservative projection of the
mckel-consumption growth rate26 and 1988 as the earliest practicable
start-up date for commercial production, the first group of miners to
apply for production authorizations could produce an aggregate of
about 200,000 tons of nickel annually. On the same assumptions, the
limit would be 320,000 tons in 1992, 490,000 tons in 1997, and 590,000
tons in 2002.
In fact, the fifteen-year, trend-line growth rate for nickel consump-
tion is currently about 3.9%, and, if that rate were to hold up in the
future, the tonnage allowed to seabed mining would be considerably
higher. If future growth should turn out to be significantly lower than
anticipated, the full effect would not be felt because of the "floor" pro-
vision in the formula. This provision substitutes a hypothetical mini-
mum growth rate of 3% for any actual rate lower than 3%. Even if the
actual growth rate fell as low as 2.2%, seabed miners could-if they
thought that they could make money in the kind of economic climate
implied by such a discouraging trend-still supply up to 18% of the
nickel market in the first year of production and up to 36% by the
fifteenth year. Notwithstanding the share of production taken up by
25. The production limitation is tied to an "interim period" of 25 years. In fact, however, it will
be in full effect for only 15 years. The interim period begins five years before commercial
production from the seabed starts, so it covers only 20 years of production. Contracts signed
in the last five years of the period, however, can call for production to begin after the limit
expires. Thus, only projects operating on a commercial scale during the first 15 years of the
industry are necessarily affected.
26. This percentage represents the United States Bureau of Mines' 1980 mid-range projection for
the balance of this century.
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the Enterprise, acting alone or in joint ventures, there would still be
sufficient tonnage under any reasonable set of assumptions to ensure
that private miners would get their authorizations when they need
them. It is thus probable that market forces, not the production limita-
tion formula, will determine how much nickel-and therefore how
much copper, cobalt and manganese-will be produced by the first
generation of seabed mining projects.
Transfer of Technology
Originally endorsed by Secretary of State Kissinger in 1976 as part
of the package compromise to set up the "parallel system," some form
of assistance to the Enterprise in acquiring technology has since that
time been an integral element of negotiations. Since 1977, the United
States' negotiating objectives have been to confine the obligation to a
specific, carefully limited one within the context of this Convention
alone. This has been a tough, hard-fought battle, and it now seems
likely to go through at least one more round.
One of the unacceptable defects of earlier drafts of the Convention
was a provision making the transfer of technology a condition for ob-
taining a contract.2 7 The current text now bars the Enterprise from
invoking the technology-transfer obligation until after the contract is in
effect and until the Enterprise has found, despite a good faith effort,
that it cannot purchase the technology it needs on the open market.
There may well be sellers eager to spread their research and develop-
ment costs. And since the Enterprise can, in any case, acquire technol-
ogy under a joint arrangement, it may never seek to obtain technology
by other means. If the Enterprise does have occasion to invoke the
obligation, it must do so on the basis of "fair and reasonable commer-
cial terms and conditions;"' any dispute as to the application of this
standard is subject to commercial arbitration. The obligation expires,
in any case, ten years after the Enterprise has begun commercial pro-
duction.
In addition, the technology covered is limited to the "specialized
equipment and technical know-how. . . necessary to assemble, main-
tain and operate" the mining system.2" A major effort by the Group of
77 to get the obligation extended to processing technology and manu-
facturing data was blocked. In the case of technology that a miner
uses but does not own, the miner is required to obtain the owner's writ-
ten assurance, which need not be legally binding, that the owner will be
prepared to do business on a similar basis with the Enterprise. The
miner must also be willing to try to acquire the legal right to transfer to
the Enterprise the mining technology that he uses but does not own, if
he can do so without substantial cost to himself.
27. See ICNT, supra note 10, arts. 4c(ii) & 5(iv).
28. Draft Convention, supra note 15, Annex III, art. 15, para. 18.
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Despite strong opposition by industrialized states, the technology
transfer provisions still contain the so-called "Brazil Clause. 2 9 This
clause allows one or more developing countries to take advantage of
these provisions in the event that the Authority authorizes them to ex-
ploit the reserved site "banked" for the Enterprise by the miner whose
technology is sought, instead of keeping the site in reserve to be ex-
ploited eventually for the Enterprise. The problem is more political
than practical, as there is little chance that the option will ever be exer-
cised. Given the cost of buying the technology and meeting the other
capital requirements of a mining project, it is scarcely conceivable that
any developing country or group of developing countries will ever un-
dertake seabed mining on its own. It would make far more sense, and
is thus far more likely, that it would choose instead to enter into some
form of association with either the Enterprise or with a multinational
company, both of which will possess the technology.
HARMONIZED NATIONAL PROGRAMS
Whether or not the above considerations will yet prove sufficiently
reassuring to leading mining representatives with respect to the basic
provisions of the Convention itself, those representatives still must deal
with uncertainties during the interval between signature and entry into
force of the Convention. I have already noted that some states have
taken steps to reduce the element of uncertainty through domestic leg-
islation. In the United States, the 1980 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral
Resources Act30 expressly established interim regulatory procedures for
ocean mining by United States' citizens. At the same time, it reaf-
firmed the United States' commitment to an acceptable Law of the Sea
Convention and placed a moratorium on commercial recovery of sea-
bed minerals until January 1, 1988, which should allow ample time for
the Convention to come into force. At such time as the treaty does
enter into force for the United States, it will automatically supersede
any legislation inconsistent with it. Similarly, the German Act on the
Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining3 establishes only provi-
sional, interim regulations, and placed a moratorium on commercial
recovery until January 1, 1988.
Both of these deep seabed mining laws look toward the establish-
ment of interim, "reciprocating states" arrangements among potential
western industrialized deep seabed mining states. Under such arrange-
ments each state would recognize the licenses for exploration and per-
mits for exploitation issued by another reciprocating state under
compatible or "harmonized" regulations. Such reciprocating states ar-
rangements would give interim assurance to seabed miners that they
29. Id Annex III, art. 3(e).
30. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1473 (West Supp. 1980) (to be codified in 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473).
31. [1980] BGBI 9080 (W. Ger.).
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have specific mining rights which would be recognized by certain other
states. Among the limited group of reciprocating participants at least,
the arrangements should create a more stable legal framework, as well
as provide for protection of the marine environment and safety of
ocean mining operations. As an interim measure, the establishment of
reciprocating states arrangements can thus lay the groundwork for po-
tential deep seabed miners to sort out a modus vivendi among them-
selves and perhaps develop some understandings upon which rules and
regulations for the Authority can be based.
But for these arrangements to serve as an alternative or a substitute
for the eventual establishment of the universal regime foreseen in the
Draft Convention is another matter. However simple and practical re-
ciprocal arrangements may seem to some, a system limited only to the
states that are capable of engaging in deep seabed mining is not "in the
cards" as a long-term solution. It is difficult to argue that one group of
states can be the sole arbiter of what the "common heritage of man-
kind" means. We must find a definition upon which all can agree,
which entails continuing refinement of the Draft Convention and, at
the same time, discussion of reciprocating states arrangements.
IMPROVING PROSPECTS FOR THE CONVENTION
To enhance prospects that the universal regime incorporated in the
Draft Convention will ultimately be ratified by all or most of the
world's nations, two general lines of endeavor are necessary: first, to
improve treaty provisions so as to ameliorate continuing concerns of
private industry in the developed countries; and second, for govern-
ments to undertake domestic measures aimed at easing the transition
into a treaty regime for their national industries.
As an essential condition for supporting the Convention, the mining
industry is thoroughly justified in insisting upon some form of interim
protection of investment. Ideally, absolute protection against disputes
over minesites, against the risk of insufficient production allocation,
and against the possibility of denial of a contract by the Authority
could all be provided by a binding "grandfather clause." It is obvious,
however, that the Conference will never go that far. Such a clause
would preempt the Authority's role with respect to the first group of
contracts; moreover, it would seem to give the mining consortia on one
side of the parallel system an unjustified advantage over the Enterprise
on the other side. At the Ninth Session in New York during 1980, the
United States submitted an informal working paper which would at
least eliminate the risk of disputed minesites.32 The United States pro-
posal envisaged that seabed mining investors would submit proposals
for two sites to the Preparatory Commission. One of these would be
32. Informal Working Paper by the United States, dated April 2, 1980: An Approach to Invest-
ment Protection, iA/l, U.N. Doc. 80-8005 (1980).
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reserved ("pre-banked") for the Enterprise. The other would be certi-
fied as having priority vis-a-vis any other later application before or
after the establishment of the Authority. This would, in effect, create
an absolute priority for the early pre-treaty investor, in case any other
applicant were to request the same site.
We should also, I believe, seek certain supplementary provisions.
To cope with the risk that a miner with major investments in develop-
ment might be denied a contract by arbitrary action by the Legal and
Technical Commission, the miner should be given the right to appeal
any such decision to commercial arbitration, where of the available
forms of dispute settlement, political bias would be least likely. To en-
sure an adequate production allocation, early investors (with continu-
ing records of sustained development activity) should be favored over
late entrants.
Although additional provisions of this nature would be desirable,
we must recognize that to be acceptable to developing countries, an
interim investment protection system will also have to take into ac-
count possible preparatory needs of the Enterprise. Such consideration
is necessary in order that the parallel system can be realized. To a lim-
ited extent, it may be feasible for the potential mining countries to help
meet these preliminary needs with regard to training of personnel and
the provision of technical data on proposed minesites.
In addition to further amendments that may be sought in the text of
the Draft Convention, there are certain purely domestic actions which
the United States and other industrialized countries could take to mini-
mize the uncertainties for seabed miners. First, some form of prepara-
tory investment protection under the treaty might be combined with
domestic risk insurance. Thorough analysis of the real risks-which, as
I have shown, are already carefully circumscribed and which can be
further reduced by the final text, as well as by the rules and regu-
lations-might persuade private, insurance companies that they could
profitably underwrite a commercial program of risk insurance. The
risks involved would probably not, in any case, be significantly greater
than those foreseen in the United States' legislation that created the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation.33 Strategic considerations,
moreover, must not be overlooked. In the unlikely event that actuarial
calculations indicated premium costs higher than the mining industry
could reasonably be expected to bear, an undisputed right to the sea-
bed's manganese and cobalt, of which North America is virtually bar-
ren, could warrant a risk insurance program involving some element of
government subsidy. Even that would be cheaper than the cost of cov-
ering the risks inherent in attempting to undertake deep seabed mining
without a treaty.
33. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 2191-2406 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Exec. Order No. 11,579 Regarding the Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation, 36 Fed. Reg. 969 (1971).
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Second, the United States government should resolve the issue of
the tax treatment to be accorded the profit-sharing payments to the In-
ternational Seabed Authority made under the Draft Convention by en-
tities subject to United States taxation.- The Department of State has
argued, correctly I believe, that such payments are no less entitled to
credits than taxes paid to a foreign government. 34 Although a firm de-
cision is not needed until the relevant portions of the text are final, a
favorable resolution of the tax-credit issue could make a critical differ-
ence in the mining industry's willingness to go forward under the Con-
vention's regime.
Another purely domestic action which could reduce the financial
burdens of seabed miners would be amendment of the Deep Seabed
Mineral Resources Act35 so as to facilitate the transition from interim
reciprocating states arrangements to the Convention's regime. In par-
ticular, there could be tax credits for expenses incurred on any outlay
which is demonstrably intended to enhance the viability of the parallel
system (for example, training personnel for the Enterprise).
Finally, there is room for maneuvering by private enterprise. Po-
tential arrangements for mining consortia to explore a minesite for the
Enterprise would provide an earnest example of the miners' intent to
respect and to help implement the parallel system.' Genuine efforts to
promote the training of future employees of the Enterprise would have
a similar effect.
For the sake of a pioneering new industry, as well as for avoiding
conflict in the oceans, it is devoutly to be wished that a combination of
these measures, and perhaps others, will lead to the final compromises
on the text of the Draft Convention that are now needed. We can then
look forward to a new chapter in international cooperation-an Inter-
national Seabed Authority that not only regulates but also operates.
The key to this consummation is the United States policy review now
under way. If our negotiating objectives are realistic we have every
propect of attaining them. If they are not realistic-if we overreach
34. This Department's position is set forth in a letter of May 6, 1978, from Warren Christopher,
then acting secretary, to James T. McIntyre, Jr., Director of the Office of Management and
Budget. In support of the Department of State view, the following reasons are offered in the
letter:
First, a tax credit for profit-sharing payments would reinforce the position we have
taken in the law of the sea negotiations that the Authority should derive most of its
revenue from income-type taxes, as opposed to auction fees or royalties. We have
maintained that a profits or income tax would take account of the economic uncer-
tainties of seabed mining by having the Authority share in the profits as well as the
risks of deep seabed mining.
Second, a tax credit would put profits taxation by the Seabed Authority on a par with
profits taxation of U.S.-owned firms operating m foreign countries, such as Canada.
To deny tax credibility for profit-sharing payments to the Authority would, thereby,
create a tax bias against seabed mining as opposed to land-based mining conducted
by American companies in foreign countries where profits taxes are creditable against
U.S. income tax liability.
Yd
35. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1473 (West Supp. 1980) (to be codified in 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473).
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and demand too much-we shall not only reduce our chances of im-
proving the deep seabed mining regime but also jeopardize the Draft
Convention's undisputed benefits to other United States interests.
